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ARGUMENT
I.

INTRODUCTION
Appellants believe they have outlined their position sufficiently in the primary brief.

They make no attempt to rebut point by point the brief of Ranger Insurance Company
("Ranger") but chose, instead, to highlight certain points which demonstrate Ranger argues
a framework or theme this court cannot adopt.
Looking at the big picture first, what Ranger has done is simply reduce the State of
Utah to some minor political district whose sovereignty, legislative public policy, and state
statutes can be trumped by private parties contracting in another state. In fact, Utah has a
history of fiercely defending its state sovereignty. To do otherwise in the context of this case
would be to reduce public policy and mandating criminal statutes to mere suggestions to
those who come from outside of our state to act as they will.
II.

RANGER WOULD IGNORE PUBLIC POLICY AT THE COST OF STATE
SOVEREIGNTY
The arguments of the Ranger brief all connect at the foundation of suggesting state

sovereignty can be ignored so public policy, built on state sovereignty, has little importance.
A look at their arguments shows this connection.
One would be hard pressed to find public policy more clearly expressed than in the
enactment of a criminal statute. There can be no reasonable dispute that Title 53, Chapter
11 of the Utah Code requires any bail enforcement agent to have a Utah license and the
1

failure to do so is a crime under Section 53-11 -124. In fact, Section 124 leaves the door open
to acting without a license to constitute a felony under appropriate circumstances when it
provides:
Any violation of this chapter is a class A misdemeanor unless the
circumstances of the violation amount to an offense subject to a greater public
penalty under Title 76, Utah Criminal Code.
See Addendum "A".
Section 53-11-124 shines through all the analysis. Ranger cannot avoid that the very
heart of the appeal is whether a private bail contract in another state trumps Section 124.
Ranger presents no reasonable logic to establish the contract is supreme over the Utah Code.
Ranger argues illogically that there is nothing in the code that says an enforcement
agent from another state can't enforce a contract here. That argument is presented as if Title
53, Chapter 11 doesn't exist. Section 53-11-107(2) clearly provides a "person" may not act
unless he is licensed. There is no limitation in the statute that excludes Miles Langley from
Colorado from being a "person".
The lack of logic in trying to interpret Title 53, Chapter 11, as Ranger has, is shown
by an analogy, the circumstances of which this court will be well aware. Specifically,
Article VIII, Section 4 of the Utah Constitution commits to the Utah Supreme Court the
power to govern the practice of law, including the admission to practice law. The Utah
Supreme Court, in turn, has promulgated Rule I, Utah State Bar Rules for Integration and
2

Management. Ruin I provides specifically that all persons authorized to practice law si.ail
be liiviised till mitpj I (lit" I Hah Male Bui I lie miles ^nvnniii}.' .uhiiissiun In I IK II (all i Slalt llliiii
do not say affirmatively that an attorney licensed out of state can't practice in Utah. Instead,
the court uses the logical construction that those that practice law in \ tab are required to
have a Utah license except under limited circumstances, such as pro hac vice admission.
• The pnml nil the analog, il» llial kaugei would m JLMI In llnir, euuil (hat an ;illnrnr\ linni
another state could come into "Utah pursuant to a contract with a client and practice without
regulation. The Supreme Court rules would be ignored under the Ranger logic. The I Jtah
Constitution, setting up a system., of regulating legal practice, w ould just be for the concern
of the local folks.
Why the Ranger logic doesn't work with the practice of law and with regulation of
bail enforcement agents is that it stabs the heart of state sovereignty. I Jtah is a sovereign
state wi
Gonzale

.* .aiiU.uuenutl aspect ol iiua S%J\ ueignty to regulate what goes on, in the state. See
s v. Of e gt m, ,

'• )C»I (on iisiiln'tiig s t a i r ' s pnwtM In u I'lillaHi'

drugs for assisted suicide).
In a criminal case, State r r .*.;/;,?. "\S P.?d "4 aT'.ah

IW^K

.• "•

IOUS

racist

murderer chahui^vd prosecution ..., .. ,.JC .^taie and i^ia.w .stems, i his court, at page
?> id Ihr opinion iqivtofi illir iifiiniu iiil1 illiiil n I in I [iiosci ulion was snmrli w\ m u l t
burdensome despite 'the fact that some courts had become more hesitant in prosecuting where
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the federal government has prosecuted already. This court stated that it disagreed completely
with the states of New Hampshire and Montana in surrendering their state sovereignty and
specifically rejected the proposition that the Utah courts make a decision reduc ing the power
(sovereignty) of Utah to act as it would within its own borders.
When the real conceptual evil of what Ranger Insurance Company argues and the
Utah Court of Appeals accepted is understood, the rest of the Ranger arguments simply fail.
For example, a lot of the Ranger brief is spent talking about how Miles Langley was
licensed in Colorado to show that Langley passed similar qualifications as to what Utah
requires of bail enforcement agents.1 The implication of Ranger's argument is that Utah
statutes really don't mean much and there would be, of course, no need for any reciprocity
agreements between states when it comes to vocational licensing. They gloss over Colorado
doesn't license persons to act in Utah and whether the training received by Langley in
Colorado is the same training requirement as to what is taught in Utah. The equivalency is
just presumed in stating that he had a license. An additional problem with the argument is
that it ignores there are 48 other states out there who may also issue licenses. The argument
rests on the assumption that anybody with a license from another state would be equivalent
to what the Utah legislature requires bail enforcement agents to have as qualifications.

danger makes this argument on page 15 of its brief citing to 2003 statutes. Note
this incident occurred April 2, 1999.
4

Ranger presents argument in absence of any kind of plan or scheme to have oversight to
make sure licensing is equivalent between what Utah requires and the licensing state of the
foreign enforcement agent.
The lengthy Ranger argument made about comity between states also fails. There is
nothing about comity that trumps state sovereignty. The argument is a broad general gloss
that states ought to be friendly to each other and so the license of a bond agent in one state
ought to automatically be accepted in every other state. Again, an extension of that logic is
that because an attorney is licensed in another state the Utah Supreme Court has wasted it
time promulgating rules for licensing attorneys who come into this state from another as if
we are all friends and just ought to recognize each other's licensing activity.
Reinforcing the view that one simply cannot come into Utah to enforce a statute
because of state sovereignty is the law of pursuit. Specifically, Section 77-9-1 of the Utah
Code enables a peace officer of another state to enter Utah "in fresh pursuit" in order to make
an arrest. Even then, Section 77-9-2 requires that peace officer to take the arrested person
before a magistrate and that the magistrate commit the person for extradition proceedings.
Put into the facts of this case, Ranger's argument leads to the conclusion a Colorado sheriff
in Langley's position enforcing a warrant for Gerald Lee would have to stop at the Utah
border but the bail bondsman could continue into Utah simply because he has a contract.

5

What stops the sheriff at the Utah border from following to enforce the warrant is the lack
of fresh pursuit and the wall of state sovereignty recognized in Title 77, Chapter 9.
Another illogical argument made by Ranger is that if Miles Langley is not free to
enforce his Colorado warrant then Utah will become a haven for fugitives. The irony of this
argument is that, as explained in the record at R., p. 45, Miles Langley was convicted in Utah
of assault from this incident in a justice court, later reduced to a disorderly conduct
conviction in the district court, and became himself a criminal. Ranger's argument ends up
being that we ought to tolerate creating criminals in Utah from other states so as to avoid
having fugitives here.
The argument about being a haven for fugitives completely ignores that there is a
comprehensive system in place for extradition of criminals found in Title 77, Chapter 30,
U.C. A. What Ranger really argues is that not only does a private contract from another state
trump Utah's bail enforcement statutes of Title 53 but also trumps extradition statutes of Title
77.
In summary, Ranger's arguments only work if one reduces sovereignty of Utah, its
statutes, and its public policy, to some kind of mere administrative district which has no
interest or power when private parties make a contract in another state. While one cannot
reasonably dispute that the power of states within our federal system has eroded since the
U.S. Constitution was adopted in 1789, state sovereignty is still alive and well and expressed
6

through the bail enforcement licensing requirement. Cf., Nevada Dept. OfHuman Resources
v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
III.

OTHER ISSUES
Some relatively minor issues were raised in the Ranger brief which deserve response

of brief mention, but do not really control the resolution of this appeal.
First, on page 14 of the Ranger brief they make the statement that the Lees make no
attempt to refute the Utah Court of Appeals that Langley had no authority to apprehend in
Utah. Lees respond here simply by inviting this court to read its brief. The argument that
the contract cannot be enforced by Langley in Utah is virtually on every page of the primary
brief in this court. There is no obligation procedurally to discuss the opinion of the Court of
Appeals as what is being considered is what happened at the trial. Lees focus here on public
policy issues as this court specifically requested and directed in granting the writ of certiorari.
The second curious issue raised is the statement that there is no evidence that Langley
was not licensed in Utah in the record. That bold statement is incorrect for two reasons.
First, it can be argued that whether Langley had a license is an affirmative defense to the
claim he had no power to make a bail apprehension in Utah. What the Lees did here is show
that he came from Colorado, misrepresented his employment to get into the Lee home, and
assaulted the Lees without legal authority. This case would be over if the defense simply
showed that Langley had a Utah license. Licensing was that of the defense to prove.

7

Second, and more importantly, Ranger knows that plaintiff offered evidence of no
Utah license at trial and the trial court rejected it in what would be reversible error.
Specifically, the record shows that at his justice court trial Miles Langley was asked if he had
a Utah bail enforcement license and he answered "no". The testimony of George Lee was
offered to establish that admission and the trial court rejected it as mere hearsay. That was
one of the issues appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals but the court declined to analyze the
issue when it held the contract was enforceable without a license in Utah. Attached as
Addendum "B" is a copy of the pages of the Lee brief before the Utah Court of Appeals to
show this court that the issue was framed and presented appropriately. This court should not
whipsaw the Lees by holding the Utah Court of Appeals and District Court were in error on
the arrest authority issue but the Lees lose on an issue the Court of Appeals refused to
consider though properly raised.
Something needs to be said about Robert Thorpe though it is not controlling on the
resolution of this appeal. Robert Thorpe failed to show up for trial and the trial court refused
to enter a default. (TT, R. page 1187 at pp. 16-19). However, the trial court entered a default
on a cross-claim in favor of Ranger against Thorpe. (Record at p. 1261). Later, Thorpe
failed to file a brief with the Utah Court of Appeals. Now, Thorpe fails to file a brief with
the Utah Supreme Court. What emerges is a message to litigants that if you don't show up
for trial and don't participate in the resulting appeals on two levels, there is no consequence.
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Appellants suggest to this court that it ought to recognize that Robert Thorpe has failed to
respond and some consequence be imposed. That consequence would logically be a simple
declaration of default on the appeal.
CONCLUSION
There can be no serious issue that Miles Langley acted outside the law in acting as a
bail enforcement agent in Utah. One only gets to the conclusion Langley could so act by
ignoring state sovereignty, state statutes, and the public policy expressed in state statutes.
This court should not take a minority view that state statutes don't abrogate the
common law of Taylor v. Taintor whereupon enforcement agents can generally pursue
fugitives where they will. To follow the old common law would be to create huge loopholes
in vocational licensing statutes. The loophole would be if you contracted with another party
outside of the state to do something that requires licensing in Utah, you can ignore Utah
criminal statutes and public policy.
This court should reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals, reverse the jury
verdict, and remand the case to the Eighth District Court for a trial conducted under a proper
application of the law regulating bail enforcement.
DATED this 1st day of March, 2006.
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C

Gregofy^^nSefs
Attorneys for Petitioner
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53-11-105 Powers and duties of board.
53-11-106 Board meetings and hearings - Quorum.
53-11-107 Licenses - Classifications - Prohibited acts.
53-11-108 Licensure - Basic qualifications.
53-11-109 Licensure - Bail enforcement agent
53-11-110 Bail enforcement agent as agency - Bond - Workers' compensation.
53-11-111 Licensure - Bail recovery agent - Requirements and limitations.
53-11-112 Licensure - Bail recovery apprentices - Requirements and limitations.
53-11-113 Bail recovery agent and bail recovery apprentice licensure - Liability insurance - Fee - Workers'
compensation.
53-11-114 Licensure - Qualification credit for specified training.
53-11-115 License fees - Deposit in General Fund.
53-11-116 Issuance of license and card to applicant - License period - Expiration of application - Transfer of license
prohibited.
53-11-116.5 Identification cards.
53-11-117 Workers' compensation requirements for employees' licensure.
53-11-118 Grounds for denial of license - Appeal.
53-11-119 Grounds for disciplinary action.
53-11-120 Requirement to identify employing agency.
53-11-121 False representation as a licensee.
53-11-122 Requirements during search and seizure - Notification of law enforcement agency.
53-11-123 Notification of local law enforcement
53dld24 Penalties.

s M I - l t t l Title.
This chapter is known as the "Bail Bond Recovery Act"
1998
5341-102 Definitions.
As used in this chapter:

53-11-107 Licenses - Classifications - Prohibited acts*
(1) Licenses under this chapter are issued in the classifications of:
(a) bail enforcement agent;
(b) bail recovery agent; or
(c) bail recovery apprentice.
(2) A person may not:
(a) act or assume to act as, or represent himself to be, a licensee unless he is licensed under this chapter;
or
(b) falsely represent that he is employed by a licensee.
(3) The commissioner shall issue licenses to applicants who qualify for them under this chapter.
(4) A license issued under this chapter is not transferable or assignable.
1998

52=11=114 Penalties.
Any violation of this chapter is a class A misdemeanor, unless the circumstances of the violation amount
to an offense subject to a greater criminal penalty under Title 76, Utah Criminal Code.
1998
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Lees. Keep in mind that the ruling of the court denying the default judgment against
Thorpe, as expressed on the record, was to protect Ranger Insurance Company even
though there was a statute in place, Section 31A-35~601(2), that would have reached the
same result Plaintiffs sought by the default even absent a default. That is, Ranger
Insurance Company is responsible as a matter of law for the wrongful acts of its bail agent
and bail recovery agent. The court was construing away from the public policy expressed
in Title 53 that bond sureties be absolutely responsible for acts of bond enforcement
agents.
The correct legal result for the court in this circumstance would have been to enter
a default of Thorpe in favor of the Plaintiffs, hoks that the default binds Ranger Insurance
Company under its agency relationship with Thorpe and the applicable law discussed
above.
This Court is requested to reverse the trial court to order that the default of Robert
Thorpe be entered and that Ranger Insurance Company, principal, be bound thereby.
F.

REVERSIBLE ERROR OCCURRED BY EXCLUDING LANGLEY'S JUSTICE
COURT ADMISSION.
Obviously, one of the key elements in establishing that Miles Langley did not have

authority to arrest was the fact that he had no Utah bail recovery agent license. As has
been pointed out above, the court completely ignored Utah's licensing scheme. The court
added to the error through a serious evidentiary error justifying reversal.
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As the record shows at p: 45, both the Lees and Langley were tried for assault in
a justice court. A trial was held and Langley was convicted of assault and the Lees were
acquitted. During the course of the justice court trial, Langley was asked if he had a Utah
bail enforcement license. He stated in the justice court that he did not.
Plaintiffs attempted to show by the testimony of George Lee that he was present in
the courtroom in the justice court and heard Miles Langley say he did not have a Utah bail
bond license. In fact, it was George Lee himself in the justice court doing the questioning
of Langley. As shown in TT, R., p. 1187, pp. 200-202, Plaintiffs attempted to offer the
justice court statement of Langley and the court found it to be hearsay, and refused to
allow it, thereby eliminating plaintiffs key proof that Langley was outside the law in making
an arrest.
Counsel for Lees argued that Langley's status was an admission by a party
opponent under Rule 801(d)(2) and a statement against interest under 804(b)(3), Utah
Rules of Evidence. Plaintiffs counsel also asserted that Rule 804(b)(1) excluded the
statement from the hearsay rule as former testimony. (TT. R., p. 1187 at 201-202).
The court said that former testimony under 804(b)(1) could only be established by
a "document". (TT. R., p. 1187 at 202). A review of the case law does not show any such
requirement. Utah has no case law on this point. However, Method of Proof of Testimony
Given at Former Examination, Hearing, or Trial, 11 A.L.R. 2d 30 at § 29 states that the
general rule is that the testimony of a witness in a former civil trial may be proved by the
15

testimony of any person who was present and heard him testify. The element that Langley
be unavailable - he was dead - is met beyond question. There is virtually no Utah case
law which suggests that the former testimony needs to be in writing and George Lee was
completely free to say what he heard Langley say in court.
The court does not give an explanation in the record as to why it did not find
Langley's statement to be a statement against interest or an admission of a party
opponent. It simply sustains the objection and the trial moves on. An examination of the
rules of evidence shows that this key testimony should have been allowed.
First, Rule 804(b)(3), U.R.E., states that where the declarant is unavailable, a
statement which tended to subject the declarant to criminal liability is admissible. (See
Addendum E). Section 53-11 -124 makes it a Class A Misdemeanor under Utah law to act
as a bail enforcement agent without a Utah license. One would be hard pressed to find a
more clear example of a statement being one within the definition of statement against
interest.
Rule 801(d)(2) makes admissible admissions by a party opponent. The rule allows
out of court statements where it is the party's own statement. Statements of admissions
are not hearsay by definition under Rule 801 and are not exceptions to the hearsay rule.
Langley's statement in the justice court to the effect that he did not have a Utah bond
enforcement license is an admission of his lack of authority to act in Utah.
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The court's exclusion of Langley's statement was later used in trial as justification
for supporting other adverse decisions against Plaintiffs. (TT. R., p. 1187 at pp. 222-223).
The trial court cited the lack of evidence of no licensing of Langley as additional reason to
support the defense theory of common law apprehension under a bail bond contract
thereby compounding the error.
This ruling excluding the evidence of no enforcement license requires reversal of
the case because it was a key element to show that Langley was outside of Utah law and
thereby without authority to act. This Court is respectfully requested to reverse the trial
court on this ground and to order a new trial as may be consistent with rulings on the other
issues raised herein.
G.

FAILURE TO ADMIT THORPE'S RECEIPT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR.
Another serious evidentiary error occurred when the court refused to allow Gerald

Lee to authenticate a receipt given by Thorpe to Lee. This receipt was proposed Plaintiff
Exhibit No. 5 found in the record at p. 986i Addendum F.
The context of this exhibit is that Langley said he was hired by Robert Thorpe to go
get Gerald Lee, that he got Gerald Lee in Utah, and that he brought Lee back to Grand
Junction and was paid cash by Thorpe for doing so. Mrs. Thorpe testified that her husband
never hired Langley, that Langley did whatever he did on his own, and that her husband,
who had not shown up for the trial, would not have paid Langley anything. (R., Video at
999).
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